India’s abstention from a UN vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been vehemently lampooned by Western media as a sign showing India’s duplicitous foreign policy under the pretext of its so called “Non-Alignment policy stemming from Nehruvian legacy.
Faced with China’s rising military and strategic clout, the U.S. sought to tighten its alliance with India indicating Biden’s administration top priority of placing Delhi as Washington’s most trustworthy strategic partner in the Indian Ocean Region.
Yet, India’s stance before the Ukrainian invasion is subtler driven by its strategic concerns against its hostile neighbour China.
As a matter of fact, India needs both the US and Russia in coping with its complex security concerns. Notwithstanding India’s struggle to balance its neutrality in this conflict, India has upheld a longstanding friendship with Russia, which plays a cardinal role in India’s current dealing with the Ukraine invasion.
Diplomatic hobnobbing
The paramount factor that comes to the fore in understanding India’s current neutral position is its historical diplomatic hobnobbing with Russia since the times of India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
It is worth examining how Nehru considered the importance of Moscow in the backdrop of India’s Non-Alignment position.
It was a known fact, that Nehru was sceptical about the Soviet expansionism and the friendship between the two nations remained obscure till the death of Stalin in 1953.
However, the Indian public opinion on Russia became more favourable when Moscow extended its support for India’s stance in Kashmir and Goa in a situation where the Western powers were less supportive towards India.
Despite Nehru’s robust campaign at the Bandung Conference in 1955 to criticise Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, Nehru reached closer diplomatic relationship with the USSR in following years.
In particular, he was appalled when the US and other Western powers sent a massive military support to Pakistan in 1957, which inevitably turned India to the USSR to purchase weapons.
The infancy stage of the friendship between the two states intensified by the Soviet assistance for oil exploration in India.
Tracing the affinity between India and Russia through historic lenses becomes relevant in comprehending India’s current position.
Moscow’s defence assistance to India in needed times has harboured the relationship between two countries.
For instance, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace signed between Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in 1971 was a decisive step for India as it undoubtedly had the most profound impacts on the geo-politics of South Asia, which cemented India’s orbit in the region.
Especially, a secret provision contained in the Indo-Soviet pact, which assured Soviet protection for India in case of any external aggression paved the path for India’s finest hour in Indo-Pak war in 1971. In 1971, the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet was deployed in the Bay of Bengal by the Nixon administration at the peak of the Indo-Pak War to support Pakistan, but it was thwarted by Soviet submarines.
In a broader scenario, Russia has conspicuously proved to be a more trust worthy partner to India than the West. Yet, the India’s security nexus and its ambition to obtain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council seem to have bemused Delhi’s position.
From one side, India is aware of the importance of maintaining a strategic alliance with the USA to counter China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia as it undermines India’s prominence in the Indian Ocean Region. Biden’s administration, which from the outset contemplated rivalry with China as the core foreign policy objective, has developed a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, where India plays a crucial role.
Yet, India felt humiliated when the US extended its nuclear technology to Australia last year as a part of the newly form pact AUKUS, which had excluded India.
Meanwhile, Russia’s support in terms of military technology to India remains static regardless of all their ideological impetus. India’s both nuclear powered submarines named as “INS Chakra” were taken on a lease from Russia and in 2019 under the Modi administration India sealed a US$ 3 billion deal with Moscow for leasing another nuclear-powered attack submarine for the Indian Navy for a ten year period.
Cordial relationship
Also, it should be noted that last December India purchased S-400 Missile system from Russia, which irked Washington.
Apart from India’s defence dependency on Russia, it is worth noting the existing cordial relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Premier Narendra Modi as both leaders have met nearly twenty times since Modi became the Prime Minister of India in 2014.
Both Putin and Modi share the same penchant towards ethnic nationalism and their ideological bent promoting the conservative values of their countries distinguish them from the liberal West based on its free market agenda.
It was exactly two years ago that Putin conferred Russia’s highest civilian award “Order of the Holy Apostle Andrew” to Indian premier Modi for his contribution to develop Indo-Russo relations.
In this backdrop of such an affinity between the two countries it is highly unlikely that India would take steps against Russia regarding the Ukrainian invasion.
The dilemma faced by India in this situation on balancing its partners deeply denotes the fragile nature of the interstate relations in a multipolar world. From a structural realistic point in international relations, one can say the notion of neutrality as India embraced would become a feeble concept before the power politics.
Dr. Punsara Amarasinghe
Former Research Fellow
Sciences PO, Paris