The three decade-long violent conflict of Sri Lanka reached an end with the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. Many initiatives taken by post-war Sri Lankan governments have not yielded any national reconciliation, in fact, the divergent interests between various social, economic and political groups and increased social fragmentation have terrified the social cohesion and the future of Sri Lanka. According to the Centre for Policy Alternatives (2013), post-war Sri Lanka has recorded more than 65 communal clashes in January 2013, illustrating the very nature of disturbed coexistence among ethnic groups. These incidents remained untreated and have renewed new divisions within society that have made the topic of national reconciliation central to political and academic debates. Even 8 years after the violent conflict, the Northern and Eastern Provinces are still under-reconstruction and military control.
The defeat of the LTTE and the death of Prabhakaran is still treated as an unbearable loss by the Tamil community (De Silva 2010). Memories of the positive features of the LTTE are likely to remain fresh in the minds of the Tamil people, and would affect any government attempt at reconciliation—whether through policies or gestures (De Silva 2010). Not only Tamils, but other Tamil-speaking communities have also paid in more ways than one for the war. The majority of the Muslim community, which was evacuated by the LTTE in the 1990s from the Northern Province, is not properly resettled.
Diversity Paradox and Political Parties
In addition, sporadic riots against the Muslim community in post-war Sri Lanka threaten the peaceful co-existence of communities. This life threatening situation of the Muslim community too is hopeless. It has led thousands of innocent Muslim families to live in fear. As regards the Sinhalese community, they remain insecure and feel fear with regard to the revival of the LTTE. As a result, the relationship between the ethnic communities is still tense with a feeling of “us” and “them”.
Prior to the advent of British colonial rule in Ceylon, the communities coexisted in relative harmony though there were distinct ethnic and social differences between people of different background. As was the case in many parts of the world, the British colonial rulers had instigated communal rivalries for their smooth and efficient administration in Ceylon. In particular, the continued demand for improved political representation for communities was discussed widely and remained a topic for political bargaining with the colonial rulers during the late 1920s and 1930s. This led the leaders to mobilize the members of the Ceylonese nation on communal lines and to articulate communal interests.
However D.S Senanayake, the Chairman of the Reception Committee, National Congress spoke at the general session of Congress on December 16, 1927 that although the National Congress was composed mainly of Sinhalese, the Congress is not only for the Sinhalese. DS Senanayake had encouraged the Tamil community not to leave the National Congress for any reason, as he wanted the Congress to represent the interests of all communities and people. He had even continuously insisted the British Empire to consider Ceylonese as members of the British Empire with equal rights.
All his efforts on behalf of the Ceylonese nation from the National Congress helped to introduce the adult suffrage which was a progressive step on the road to political democracy. However, it is important to know that prior to the Legislature of Soulbury, there were no political parties, but the members were grouped into organizations like, Ceylon Congress, Sinhala Maha Sabha. In the 1940s, the implementation of the Soulbury Constitution had necessitated the development of political parties to implement the parliamentary system in Ceylon. In such a situation DS Senanayake first established the United National Party (UNP) in 1946 as a non-communal party. The policy of the UNP was to represent the interests of members from all sections of the country. However, one could possibly argue that this lacked with SWRD Bandaranaike whose Sinhala Maha Sabha advocated the linguistic and religious matters which were not congruent with the polices of the UNP.
Personal power and privilege
Jennings writes, “Sinhala Maha Sabha is not an organization of Buddhist enthusiasts but an attempt to exploit communalism for personal power and privilege”. In fact, for political benefits, many political leaders brought communal politics to the fore. This fanned communal rivalries which deepened distrust among the communities in post-independence Sri Lanka.
Soon after independence, the newly formed independent government (under the premiership of DS Senanayake) attempted to build the united Ceylonese nation with its professed goals of nation-building. A few parliamentary Acts such as the Citizenship Act (1948), and Indian-Pakistani Citizenship Act (1949) were enacted which the government saw necessary to generate a shared identity of unifying Ceylon after the British departure. In some ways, the Ceylonese government has been successful, though this has come at the price of denying civil and political rights of the Indian Tamils.
During his political career, DS Senanayake never supported or made a claim for a special treatment to ‘Buddhism’. He never attempted to make Sinhala as the official language of the country. He never attempted to make a language problem in the country as he had a wider tolerance and passion for making Ceylon a single nation. DS Senanayake has focused more on issues related to livelihood but not to uplift the status of language and religion. He always had a mentality that a united nation could be possible when there is a generous attitude towards the minorities. In other words, as a first Prime Minister, he was the only statesman who worked greatly for communal harmony. However, after his tenure, the Sinhala Only Act was enacted by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) to replace English, and make Sinhala the official language.
It was said that for the first few years following Independence, the UNP government with its majority representation for the interests of the westernized elite and other privileged urban groups, failed to consider the interests of the rural-poor Sinhalese. As a result, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party to gain the political vote of the rural Sinhalese had provided language (Sinhala) and religion (Buddhism) a higher constitutional status. This situation provided the opportunity for Tamil leaders to seek self-determination since these disastrous policies led to deep ethnic divisions between Tamil-speaking communities and the Sinhalese.
The strained relationship between the Sinhalese and Tamils worsened when the sporadic riots against Tamils took place, the worst riots in July 1983. In such situations, state repression against these riots created further animosity forcing the Tamil youth to defend themselves against attacks from the Sinhalese. Eelam War I is the initial phase of the armed conflict (1970s to July 23 1983) between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. In the 1990s, the Eastern Muslim community was also dragged into the fighting by attacks from the LTTE. All this was exacerbated further by the ethnic violence in the north and east. Sri Lanka faced Ealam War II (1990), and Ealam War III (1995). During this period, all communities experienced high levels of ethnic violence which further increased the mistrust and feelings of hatred between communities. The massacre of 147 Muslims at prayer in the Kattankudy mosque in the Eastern Province triggered hatred between the Tamils and Muslims. This was further worsened in 1990 when the L.T.T.E chased away nearly 75,000 Muslims from the districts such as Mannar, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Vavuniya and Mullaittivu within a 48-hour period.
Non-confrontational approach
The situation remained unchanged until the peace talks in 2002 (facilitated by Norway) to stop the military attacks between the LTTE and the government forces in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. At one point, to reach a political solution through peaceful negotiations, Ranil Wickremasinghe as the Prime Minister signed the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE on February 22 2002. To end the 20 years of conflict, Ranil Wickremesinghe insisted a permanent solution based on a united Sri Lanka. In order to find a peaceful political solution, the peace talks were held in many countries, and attended by LTTE delegates, but came to an end without success. Ranil had adopted a non-confrontational approach to the LTTE to reach an amicable political solution. Nevertheless, even though no settlement was reached between 2002 and 2006, there was at least no fighting in the country. The Presidential Election of 2005 dashed any hopes for peace when the LTTE announced a boycott of the election by the Tamils. This led to the Sinhala nationalist candidate, Mahinda Rajapaksa, receiving a narrow win without the Tamil vote from the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Once President Rajapaksa came to power as President, he resumed military operations against the LTTE and began Eelam War IV in July 2007 with government forces capturing the entire Eastern Province. In January 2008 the government launched a large military attack against the LTTE in the Northern Province, particularly in Vanni. By January 2009, the Sri Lankan military forces had taken control of Kilinochchi, the administrative capital of the LTTE since 1999, and the heavy fighting between January and May 2009 (to seize the rest of Vanni) ended when the Sri Lankan government army captured Mullaitivu.
The Rajapaksa government saw the total defeat of LTTE as a complete victory for the government forces and regarded no necessity for political discussions. However, without a political solution, there can be no hope of national reconciliation through meaningful power sharing. However, ethnic or communal reconciliation need to come from strong inter-ethnic relations which would allow all parties to work on a political solution.
Attempts at centralization by the Rajapaksa government appeared to offer no hope of solving the ethnic conflict through a meaningful political solution, despite its best efforts to amend the Constitution and enact parliamentary Bills. However, the Sirisena- Wickremesinge government has taken again a soft approach to address the matter of national reconciliation in a non-partition manner.
The coalition government attempts to prevent a repetition of what took place in the past ensuring the non-occurrence of communal violence. I believe this is the key to facilitate the process of national reconciliation in Sri Lanka.
The writer who holds a PhD (Western Sydney), MA (Hawaii) is a Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya