The Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) which probed the Easter Sunday terror attacks presented its final report to Parliament on Wednesday (October 23). It held the State Intelligence Service (SIS) responsible for the lapses in the security establishment which paved the way for the multiple terror attacks which killed over 277 persons and wounded around 400 persons. The PSC in its report has exposed a series of intelligence and coordination lapses prior to Easter Sunday carnage and held that former SIS Chief Nilantha Jayawardena was primarily responsible for the failure to avert the deadly attacks.
The 272 paged PSC report said following the attacks, evidence emerged that prior intelligence information was available regarding the impending attack but that it was not acted upon. The PSC notes that intelligence information related to the attacks was first received by the Director, SIS on April 04, 2019 but there were delays from his end to share it with the relevant intelligence and security personnel. The Director, SIS was called by name by the then Secretary MOD to brief the ICM on April 09, 2019 but failed to do this by saying he would send a written update on the intelligence received. This, the PSC notes is a major failure from the Director SIS, the lead in the intelligence apparatus who had received pride of place at the ICM and NSC.
The PSC notes that the intelligence information received on April 04, 2019 was of a very serious nature and it was categorised as ‘Top Secret’ and ‘Top Priority’. The PSC is intrigued as to why the Director SIS did not share this intelligence information at the ICM held on April, 09 2019 when others at the ICM could have been briefed of the nature of the intelligence information. Instead, the Director, SIS says that he will send a note to the IGP. This is a glaring error on the part of the Director, SIS.
Failures
The PSC stresses on the failure on the part of the SIS to act upon the subsequent intelligence information received after the explosion on April 16, 2019 in Kattankudy. The PSC notes that the Director SIS bears the greatest responsibility. This is compounded by the fact that since April 08, 2018, a full one year before the incident, he had in writing requested the IGP for the shutting down of investigations by others on Zahran, which resulted in the SIS becoming the sole investigator. This failure by the SIS has resulted in hundreds of deaths, many more injured and immeasurable devastation to Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans and this must not be treated lightly.
The PSC further notes, that whilst the greatest responsibility remains with the Director SIS, others too failed in their duties. Within the security and intelligence apparatus, the Secretary MOD, IGP, CNI and DMI failed in their responsibilities. All were informed of the intelligence information prior to the Easter Sunday attacks but failed to take necessary steps to mitigate or prevent it.
A lack of strategic vision within the security and intelligence apparatus was indicated by testimony made to the PSC, contributed by the lack of necessary expertise required “to understand evolving threats and challenges and how a post war country should be prepared in terms of global and national dynamics.”
The PSC is unaware of the training and expertise of the Director SIS in relation to intelligence gathering and action that was required upon receiving sensitive intelligence. “If individuals with the necessary expertise were heading such key positions, there is a possibility that steps to mitigate and prevent may have been taken early on,” it states.
The PSC has observed that the President failed on numerous occasions to give leadership and also actively undermined Government and systems including adhoc NSC meetings and leaving out key individuals from such meetings. The fissures in the Government were evident
in 2018, and were amplified with the Constitutional Crisis. These also impacted the security apparatus. Several others are listed as having failed in their duties including the Prime Minister, State Minister for Defence and the Attorney General’s Department.
Further investigations will be needed “to understand whether those with vested interests did not act on intelligence so as to create chaos and instil fear and uncertainty in the country in the lead up to the Presidential Election to be held later in the year. Such a situation would then lead to the call for a change of regime to contain such acts of terrorism.”
Recommendations
The PSC has made eight recommendations that require urgent attention and these are broadly categorised as follows: Essential reforms in the security and intelligence sector, the establishment of an enhanced financial supervisory mechanism, the need to control and monitor the rise of religious extremism, addressing delays in justice-reforming in the Attorney-General’s Department, Wahabism and the need for action, media reporting, fake news and other areas of concern, Holding politicians/and peoples representatives accountable and reforming the educational sector to counter growing extremism.
Key reforms are recommended to reform the NSC as there is “clear evidence of [its] dysfunctional nature”. The PSC calls for strengthened NSC with a secretariat comprising of experienced staff to support its work. “A reformed NSC should have the expertise on intelligence and security issues and be able to advise the government on key developments and actions that should be taken,” it states, adding that “They should also be able to coordinate with relevant ministries in terms of security measures and infrastructure.”
The PSC recommends a new position of National Security Advisor (NSA) to be created in the executive branch, and assigned to “a person with the relevant expertise in intelligence and security issues ... able to oversee the work of the NSC secretariat and keep the President and the government abreast of security issues.” The NSA should have the mandate to organise NSC meetings and initiate follow up action and will be responsible to the Minister of Defence and to keep the President and Prime Minister informed of developments.
Further, the PSC recommends the creation of an independent expert panel to monitor the work of the security and intelligence structures, study the legal and administrative framework and practical issues such as capacity and resources.
Politicisation
The PSC notes that the Constitutional Crisis in 2018 must be referenced at the outset as this had a direct bearing on the governance and security situation in Sri Lanka.
The Committee observes that the political fallout of the Constitutional Crisis and the bitter fight between the country’s leaders had contributed to the decline of the security apparatus in the country.
The PSC has outlined that in addition to the lapses in the intelligence security sector, increased politicisation in the structures and systems in place is evident. The instructions by the President not to invite the Prime Minister and State Minister of Defence are a direct breakdown of communication and the ability to work together by the two parties in Government. Leaving out key political leaders from security and intelligence briefings was used as a political tool by the President. This breakdown is further compounded by the President instructing senior administrators not to attend meetings called by the Prime Minister. This is unacceptable and has contributed to present challenges in governance and security in the country.
The PSC also notes that this incident occurred in the context of changes in the leadership of the Sri Lankan Army and DMI in 2019. These are extremely serious observations that can impact the democratic governance, electoral processes and security of Sri Lanka and must require urgent attention.
The PSC asks a series of pertinent questions: “were attempts made by sections in the intelligence community with the possible support from some politicians to undermine ongoing investigations, prevent arrests of alleged perpetrators and not share valuable information? Was the unrest and communal violence since 2018 a way to exacerbate the uncertainity and create further fear among communities, especially the Muslim community? Was this to demonstrate the lack of control by the Sirisena-Wickramasinghe government and to amplify calls for a change of regime?”
Extremism
The PSC also makes note of the rising extremism in Sri Lanka. Evidence received by the PSC indicates that Zahran started a campaign to radicalise Muslim youth and motivate them to use violence to achieve their ends following the March 2018 attacks on Muslims in Digana. However, investigations to date have not shown any evidence that Zahran had direct links with the ISIS. The PSC observes that several people of Kattankudy and several local Muslim groups made complaints against Zahran as early as 2013/2014 to the authorities.
The PSC notes that the spread of Wahhabism and the Arabization of Kattankudy contributed to the growth of extremism in the Islamic community especially in the East and this must be further investigated. Evidence received by the PSC indicates that Arabization commenced and was fostered in Kattankudy by former Eastern Province Governor M.L.A.M. Hizbullah.